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INTERACTION BETWEEN TRADE AND 
COMPETITION: WHY A MULTILATERAL 
APPROACH FOR THE UNITED STATES? 
SEUNG WHA CHANG* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Competition law is no longer a strictly domestic law that deals 
with monopolies in internal markets only.  For instance, megamergers 
between two foreign companies often tend to be subject to a third 
country’s antitrust investigation.  In the case where an antitrust au-
thority assesses whether transborder activities are anticompetitive, 
the relevant geographic markets normally extend beyond national 
geographical borders.1  This international conception of “relevant 
markets” indicates that competition law is very often closely related 
to international trade.  As a result, international economic institutions 
such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) have discussed competition law and policy and its in-
teraction with international trade law and policy.2 
 
 * Professor of Law, Seoul National University; Visiting Professor of Law, Duke Univer-
sity School of Law & University of Tokyo (Spring 2004).  LL.M (‘92) & S.J.D. (‘94) Harvard 
Law School.  He has served as a judge of the Seoul District Court and has taught at Stanford, 
Georgetown, Duke and Geneva Universities.  He was also a founding member of the Perma-
nent Group of Experts under the WTO SCM Committee and has served for five WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings as a panelist or an arbitrator.  This Article benefits from helpful com-
ments by Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas Cottier, Marco Bronckers, Changhee Lee, Sangjo Jong, 
Okrial Song, Youngjin Jung, and Dukeun Ahn.  The author wishes to thank Yong Lim, Jaesung 
Lee and Youngsoo Shin for their research and editorial assistance. 
 1. For example, during the investigation of international graphite electrode cartels in 
which six companies from Japan, the United States and Germany were involved, the United 
States’ antitrust authorities had to assess anticompetitive effects in the worldwide market be-
yond U.S. territorial limits.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Japanese Subsidiary 
Charged with International Conspiracy to Fix Prices for Graphite Electrodes in U.S. (Feb. 23, 
1998), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1998/1372.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 
2004); INT’L COMPETITION POL’Y ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ANTITRUST 
172–73 (2000), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2004) 
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
 2. See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
(OECD), COMPETITION AND TRADE POLICIES: THEIR INTERACTION (1984), available at 
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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)3 was 
born in 1947 with the purpose of liberalizing international trade and 
reducing or eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  The GATT 
successfully performed its mission, eventually consigning that mission 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO),4 which has significantly 
contributed to reducing or eliminating “public” trade barriers.5  The 
WTO continues to liberalize trade through a series of multilateral 
trade negotiations in various sectors.6  Nonetheless, anticompetitive 
activities committed by private companies have recently emerged as a 
new type of serious trade barrier.7  These barriers are called “private” 
trade barriers due to the fact that they are not set by governments, 
but rather by private actors.  This phenomenon has triggered a discus-
sion of whether the WTO should have an agreement on competition 
policy and thereby contribute to the removal of trade distortion cre-
ated by private trade barriers in international markets. 
At its Singapore Ministerial Conference held in December 1996, 
the WTO decided for the first time to discuss the interaction between 
 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/51/2375610.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter 
COMPETITION AND TRADE POLICIES]; OECD, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal & Enterprise 
Affairs, Reflections on the Interaction between Trade Policy and Competition Policy: A Contribu-
tion to the Development of A Conceptual Framework, OECD Doc. COM/TD/ 
DAFFE/CLP(93)16 (Feb. 17, 1993); OECD Trade Commission, Interrelationship Between 
Competition and Trade Policies, OECD Doc. TD/TC/WP(92)20/REV2 (Apr. 20, 1993).  For a 
work of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), see generally 
UNCTAD, CLOSER MULTILATERAL COOPERATION ON COMPETITION POLICY: THE 
DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION (2002), a “Consolidated Report on issues discussed during the Pa-
nama, Tunis, Hong Kong and Odessa Regional Post-Doha Seminars on Competition Policy held 
between 21 March and 26 April 2002.” 
 3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 
reprinted in GATT B.I.S.D. (Vol. IV) at 1 (1969) [hereinafter GATT].  Most of the legal 
documents and agreements establishing the GATT and the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and relating to their substance may be found at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ 
legal_e.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). 
 4. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 13 
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
 5. For a general history, see WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 15–19 (2003), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 
2004). 
 6. For an understanding of the general trend, see WTO, THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION IN BRIEF 2 (2003), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2004). 
 7. For a summary of discussions in this matter, see WTO, Report (1998) of the Working 
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, 
WT/WGTCP/2, §§ 81–89 (Dec. 8, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 Working Group Report]; see also 
WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Report on the 
Meeting of 11–13 March 1998, WT/WGTCP/M/4, ¶¶ 21–46 (June 24, 1998). 
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trade and competition policy.8  The Ministerial Conference estab-
lished the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade 
and Competition (WTO Competition Working Group), which has 
discussed issues of interaction at a theoretical level, without produc-
ing any definite agreement.  The Fourth Session of the Ministerial 
Conference held in November and December 2001 in Doha, Qatar, 
set the legal basis for launching negotiations on the interaction be-
tween trade and competition policy, which is considerable progress 
from the merely theoretical discussion existing under the WTO Com-
petition Working Group.9  Paragraph 23 of the Doha Ministerial Dec-
laration authorized the WTO Members to negotiate on the interac-
tion between trade and competition policy for a multilateral 
framework to enhance the contribution of competition policy to in-
ternational trade and development after the Fifth Session of the Min-
isterial Conference, held in summer of 2003.  Paragraph 23 required 
the launching of negotiations on the interaction between trade and 
competition policy based upon a decision to be taken, by explicit con-
sensus, at the Cancun Ministerial Conference on the modalities of ne-
gotiations.  In addition, during the period leading up to the Fifth Ses-
sion, the WTO Competition Working Group was authorized to work 
on the clarification of “core principles, including transparency, non-
discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on hard-core 
cartels; modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for pro-
gressive reinforcement of competition institutions in developing 
countries through capacity building.”10  The WTO Competition 
Working Group made substantial progress on these issues.11  Unfor-
tunately, however, the Cancun Ministerial Conference held in Sep-
 
 8. See WTO Ministerial Conference, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/ 
DEC, ¶ 20  (Dec. 18, 1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/ min96_e/ 
wtodec_e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Singapore Ministerial Declaration]. 
 9. See WTO Ministerial Conference, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 
20, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration].  Paragraph 23 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration states: 
Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to enhance the contribution of 
competition policy to international trade and development, and the need for enhanced 
technical assistance and capacity-building in this area . . . , we agree that negotiations 
will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a 
decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotia-
tions. 
 10. Id. ¶ 25. 
 11. For a summary of this work, see WTO Working Group on Interaction Between Trade 
and Competition Policy, Report (2002) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade 
and Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/6, ¶¶ 9–103 (Dec. 9, 2002). 
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tember 2003 failed to reach an explicit consensus on the modalities of 
such negotiations, as is required under Paragraph 23 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration.  Such failure to agree on the modalities of 
negotiations on the interaction between trade and competition policy, 
as well as for other Singapore issues,12 led to the collapse of the whole 
package of the Cancun Ministerial Conference.13  Hence, any further 
progress to negotiate for a multilateral framework on the interaction 
between trade and competition policy has currently been suspended.  
It was hoped that the General Council, held in December 2003, would 
create political momentum to revive the move towards negotiations 
for such a multilateral framework.  It did not produce any positive re-
sults, however. 
Why did WTO Members fail to reach an agreement to launch 
negotiations for a multilateral framework to enhance the contribution 
of competition policy to international trade?  At least two plausible 
reasons can be pointed out.  First, the proponents of such negotia-
tions—specifically, the European Community (EC) and the so-called 
Like-Minded Countries—failed to persuade developing countries that 
a multilateral framework agreement on interaction between trade and 
competition policy is beneficial to their national interests.14  In addi-
tion, the United States was passive in this matter and basically took a 
pessimistic stance on a further move towards a multilateral frame-
work agreement on interaction between trade and competition pol-
icy.15  Given the fact that the developing countries are currently hesi-
tant to negotiate a multilateral framework agreement on competition 
policy at the WTO, it is not difficult to predict that the WTO option 
to address the interaction issues through a formal negotiation will not 
materialize unless the United States changes its position and supports 
this move.  However, the United States traditionally has believed that 
non-WTO policy tools, such as unilateral and bilateral channels, may 
better address trade concerns arising from competition-related mat-
ters.16  Such alternative, non-WTO policy tools include the extraterri-
torial application of U.S. antitrust law, United States Section 301’s 
 
 12. The so-called Singapore issues are (1) trade and investment, (2) trade and competition, 
(3) transparency in government procurement, and (4) trade facilitation.  See Singapore Ministe-
rial Declaration, supra note 8, ¶¶ 19–21. 
 13. Cancun Ministerial Collapses over Singapore Issues, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 15, 2003, 
at 1, 6–8. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Latest Declaration Unbundles Singapore Issues, Proceeds To Negotiations On Two, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 13, 2003 [hereinafter Latest Declaration]. 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
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competition-related clause, the WTO dispute settlement process, and 
positive comity.17 
This paper is organized as follows: Part II examines a theoretical 
underpinning of the interaction between trade and competition pol-
icy.  It first discusses whether trade law and policy can be harmonized 
with competition law and policy or whether they must necessarily 
conflict.  Part II also demonstrates how trade law and policy and 
competition law and policy have interacted over the course of their 
historical development, describing their origins and the expansion of 
their coverage and observing that the current competition law, as well 
as the WTO Agreement, are ill-equipped and unable to tackle new 
trade concerns arising at the interface between trade and competition 
policy. 
Part III provides a historical background demonstrating how this 
issue of the interaction between trade and competition has emerged 
under international institutional settings.  At the same time, Part III 
shows how the EC and Like-Minded Countries have pursued their at-
tempt to address competition-related matters at the WTO and how 
the United States and developing countries have responded.  In par-
ticular, Part III describes why the United States has been hesitant to 
follow in the WTO’s move towards multilateral negotiations on com-
petition policy. 
Part IV analyzes individual issues arising at the interface be-
tween trade law and policy and competition law and policy.  The ma-
jor focus of Part IV is to show why non-WTO options, which the 
United States has relied upon thus far, are theoretically or practically 
unwarranted, and therefore cannot be valid alternatives to the WTO 
option for a multilateral framework agreement on the interaction be-
tween trade and competition.  Individual issues to be discussed will 
include the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law, United 
States Section 301’s competition-related clause, WTO dispute settle-
ment, and positive comity.18 
On the basis of this analysis, Part V supports the proposed for-
mal WTO negotiations for the framework agreement on the interac-
tion between trade and competition, and suggests some options for 
modalities of future negotiations.  It concludes with a recommenda-
tion that the United States come forward and assume a leadership 
 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. The antidumping issue is another important topic from the perspective of competition 
policy.  Nonetheless, this paper does not address antidumping for the practical reason that this 
issue has sunk below the surface of WTO negotiations, as noted in Part III. 
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role in the launching of negotiations for a multilateral framework to 
enhance the contribution of competition policy to international trade 
and development. 
II. INTERACTION BETWEEN TRADE  
AND COMPETITION POLICY 
A. A Theoretical Dimension: Objectives of Trade and Competition 
Law & Policy 
What is the general objective of trade policy?  While there may 
be many possible answers, it is generally accepted that the main pur-
pose of a state’s trade policy is to regulate international trade for the 
purpose of furthering the economic interests of its own citizens.19  The 
principal means to accomplish such an objective are free trade and 
market liberalization.  Free trade means the elimination, or at least 
the reduction, of private and public barriers to market access—the in-
troduction of foreign competition into domestic markets which ulti-
mately results in an increase in consumer welfare and a more efficient 
allocation of the world’s resources.  At least theoretically, therefore, 
trade policy contributes to an increase in consumer welfare and eco-
nomic efficiency. 
Meanwhile, the objective of competition policy is to protect con-
sumers and to promote “competition.”20  Historically, there has been 
much debate as to what end result one would actually accomplish 
through the protection of competition.  An age-old disagreement re-
garding the ultimate goal of competition policy seems to have been 
generally narrowed down to economic efficiency or consumer wel-
fare.21  Promoting economic efficiency and consumer welfare through 
competition requires an open market free from entry barriers and the 
safeguarding of free trade and effective competition.  In this sense, 
competition policy basically supports free trade and market liberaliza-
tion. 
In sum, trade policy enhances economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare through free trade and market liberalization, while competi-
tion policy advocates an open market and free trade in order to 
 
 19. See 1998 Working Group Report, supra note 7, ¶¶ 22–23. 
 20. Cf. id. ¶ 50. 
 21. See id. ¶ 48.  For an in depth discussion of this issue, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 90–115 (2d ed. 1993); Philip Areeda, 
Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 523, 534–37 (1983). 
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achieve economic efficiency and consumer welfare.  Accordingly, it 
can be said that both policies, by their nature, pursue identical goals 
and are mutually supportive of the other.22 
In reality, however, conflicts may arise between trade law and 
policy and competition law and policy.  As for trade policy, its objec-
tive—for example, protecting national welfare—should embrace the 
protection of both consumer and producer interests.  Nevertheless, 
producers’ interests are normally more politically influential and bet-
ter organized than those of consumers and thus more evident in the 
actual implementation of trade policy tools.  In contrast, the objective 
of competition law is not the protection of “producers.”  Rather, the 
protection of consumer welfare through competition is the overriding 
objective of competition law.  Although there seems to be some de-
bate regarding the definition of which “consumers” deserve protec-
tion under competition policy, one can safely say that it would clearly 
be contrary to the objective of competition policy to sacrifice the in-
terests of individual consumers so as to promote the producers’ inter-
ests only.  In other words, the objective of competition policy is to 
protect “competition,” not “competitors.”23  Thus, in practice, trade 
law and policy tends to be implemented so as to protect producers’ 
interests, whereas competition law and policy primarily promotes 
consumers’ interests.  Of necessity, conflicts arise between these two 
policies. 
There are other sources of conflict.  First, if legal or policy meas-
ures are enforced in a way that deviates from their basic objectives, 
conflicts may arise.  For example, export or import cartels are usually 
exempt from the application of national competition laws for certain 
 
 22. See 1998 Working Group Report, supra note 7, ¶ 46. 
 23. See Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (noting that “the 
legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competition, not 
competitors”); see also Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (“[The 
objective of antitrust law] is not to protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to 
protect the public from failure of the market.”).  The current U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
Antitrust Division also accepts this as a prevailing antitrust principle.  See Deborah P. Majoras, 
Antitrust Going Global in the 21st Century, Speech Presented at the Federal Bar Association, 
Corporate and Association Counsels Division and American Corporation Counsel Association, 
Northeast Ohio Chapter (Oct. 17, 2002) (stating the need to “[p]rotect competition, not 
competitors.”), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200418.htm (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2004); Charles A. James, International Antitrust in the 21st Century: Cooperation and 
Convergence, Speech Before the OECD Global Forum on Competition (Oct. 17, 2001) (stating 
that “no principle is more central to U.S. law that that antitrust protects competition, not 
competitors”), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9330.htm (last visited Jan. 
10, 2004). 
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purposes, even though they might be anticompetitive.24  However, 
such export or import cartels normally have a serious trade-restrictive 
effect, suggesting that they should be condemned from a trade policy 
perspective.  Thus, a conflict arises between trade policy and competi-
tion laws that exempt such anticompetitive behaviors from their ap-
plication.  Another example on the trade policy side is antidumping 
measures.  Antidumping measures, although explicitly allowable un-
der certain conditions, may be perceived as a violation of the nondis-
crimination principle that forms a fundamental cornerstone of the 
multilateral trade system.  These antidumping measures, which are 
permitted under express conditions, may have anticompetitive effects 
on importing markets, and thus may be problematic when viewed un-
der competition policy standards.25    
Finally, conflict may arise because trade law and policy and com-
petition law and policy each provide different standards for determin-
ing the legality of certain measures.  For instance, vertical restraints 
that restrict the market entry of foreign exports, and as a result have 
trade-restrictive effects, are normally condemned under trade policy 
standards.  In many cases, however, such vertical restraints may have 
procompetitive effects, and, as a result, may be lawful under competi-
tion policy standards.26  In light of the foregoing, it can be said that 
trade law and policy and competition law and policy can be mutually 
supportive, but in practice may conflict with each other for many dif-
ferent reasons.27 
B. A Historical Dimension: Coverage of Trade and Competition 
Law and Policy 
1. Historical Evolution of Competition Law.  This section shows 
how both competition law and policy and trade law and policy his-
torically have developed along their own paths as well as how they 
have interacted with each other.  Competition law has its roots in the 
 
 24. WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Re-
port on the Meeting of 11–13 March 1998, WT/WGTCP/M/4, ¶ 31 (June 24, 1998). 
 25. See Harvey M. Applebaum, The Antidumping Laws—Impact on the Competitve Proc-
ess, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 590, 600–02 (1974); Robert D. Willig, Economic Effects of Antidumping 
Policy, in BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM 57–79 (Robert Z. Lawrence ed., 1998). 
 26. See 1998 Working Group Report, supra note 7, ¶ 86. 
 27. For details on the theoretical relationship between trade and competition policies dis-
cussed in the WTO Competition Working Group, see WTO Working Group on the Interaction 
between Trade and Competition Policy, Report on the Meeting of 27 and 28 November 1997, 
WT/WGTCP/M/3, ¶¶ 4–7, 18–19 (Feb. 26, 1998). 
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Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.28  The Sherman Act was later sup-
plemented by the Federal Trade Commission Act29 and the Clayton 
Act.30  U.S. citizens usually perceive antitrust law as a genuinely 
American law since it was first developed in the United States and 
has had an impact on the competition laws of virtually all other major 
trading partners.  Up until the 1970s, U.S. antitrust law was mainly 
regarded as domestic law, and the antitrust authorities normally did 
not seek an international application of antitrust laws.31  As the 
United States started suffering from trade deficits in the early to mid-
1970s, U.S. antitrust authorities began to change their attitude toward 
the jurisdictional reach of antitrust law.  In particular, with the sudden 
increase of Japanese exports into U.S. markets, U.S. antitrust authori-
ties began to take a serious interest in the activities of foreign compa-
nies in foreign territories.  This was due to then rising concerns that 
the U.S. trade deficit might be at least partially a result of the wrong-
doings of foreign exporters within their own territories.32  For in-
stance, it was assumed that Japanese exporters colluded in price fix-
ing within Japan, and that their collusive price fixing had an adverse 
impact on the U.S. market.  As a result, there was a perceived need 
for U.S. antitrust authorities to enforce their own antitrust law against 
such foreign activities.  This is a classic feature of the extraterritorial 
application of antitrust law.33  Because extraterritorial application of 
antitrust law normally applies to activities involving exports or im-
ports, one can describe such a phenomenon as the expansion of com-
petition law into areas traditionally covered by trade law and policy. 
More explicit interaction between competition law and policy 
and trade law and policy began to occur during the 1990s.  The tradi-
 
 28. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000). 
 29. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2000). 
 30. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14–19, 20, 21, 22–27 (2000). 
 31. This can be evidenced by the fact that the U.S. Congress had not taken any legislative 
action for an international application of antitrust law until it enacted Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvement Act (FTAIA) in 1982, which set out the outer limit of US court jurisdiction on 
competition issues involving foreign commerce.  See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act 
of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (2000). 
 32. This concern coincides with the legislative background for Section 301 of the Trade Act 
of 1974.  Trade Act of 1974 §§ 301–310, 19 U.S.C. § 2411–31 (2000) (as amended) [hereinafter 
Section 301].  For background, see generally Seung Wha Chang, Taming Unilateralism under the 
Multilateral Trading System: Unfinished Job in the WTO Panel Ruling on United States Sections 
301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 31 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1151, 1153–58 (2000). 
 33. The Alcoa Case, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 
1945), was the first attempt at extraterritorial application.  However, it was in the 1980s that ex-
traterritorial application of antitrust law began drawing attention in connection with trade is-
sues. 
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tional extraterritorial application of antitrust law as described above 
is typically aimed at preserving competition inside the U.S. market 
and therefore does not significantly differ from domestic antitrust en-
forcement in its goals.  However, in the early 1990s U.S. antitrust au-
thorities began to proclaim that the United States would apply its an-
titrust law to anticompetitive practices within foreign jurisdictions 
that restrict the access of U.S. exporters to foreign markets—the so-
called “export-restraint” or “market access restraint” problem.34  This 
clearly revealed U.S. antitrust authorities’ willingness to use antitrust 
legislation for the purpose of furthering U.S. trade interests.  The 
level of interaction between competition law and policy and trade law 
and policy intensified as antitrust law began functioning in a manner 
normally reserved for trade law.  Nevertheless, due to the theoretical 
and practical limitations underlying this particular type of extraterri-
torial application of antitrust law, as discussed in Part IV of this pa-
per, the United States appeared to resort to alternative policy tools as 
well. 
First, the United States inserted a competition-related clause 
when amending Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,35 which is tradi-
tionally regarded as representative of U.S. trade law for opening for-
eign markets.36  This attempt can be viewed as having imbued Section 
301 with “competition law and policy,” thus fashioning it as a new 
weapon to open foreign markets.  Nevertheless, the Kodak-Fuji Film 
dispute is a good illustration of the theoretical and practical limits of 
such an exercise.37  In addition, the United States tried to set up inter-
national fora to discuss possible international cooperation to facilitate 
the extraterritorial application of antitrust law.  These efforts culmi-
nated in the adoption by the OECD of a recommendation for coop-
eration on the international application of antitrust law.38  In the same 
 
 34. The DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) formally articulated this position 
in April of 1995.  See generally DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED’L TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
atr/public/guidelines/internat.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter 1995 DOJ/FTC 
GUIDELINES]. 
 35. Section 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411.  See supra note 32. 
 36. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), THE PRESIDENT’S 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 
ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, in 1995 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 1994 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 
17, 95–97 (1995) [hereinafter USTR, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 37. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 38. See, e.g., OECD, Draft Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Coopera-
tion Between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade, 
OECD Doc. C(95)130 (1995) (recommending “notification, exchange of information and co-
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vein, the United States made efforts to enter into bilateral agreements 
with its major trading partners in order to secure assistance for the ex-
traterritorial application of its antitrust law.39  Nonetheless, due to the 
unilateral nature of the extraterritorial application, these efforts were 
often met with claims of infringement upon the other state’s sover-
eignty and ultimately proved to be unproductive.40 
As the foregoing unilateral efforts generally have proved to be 
unsatisfactory, the United States appears to have advocated the prin-
ciple of “positive comity.”41  “Positive comity” generally refers to a 
form of cooperation where a country gives full and sympathetic con-
sideration to another country’s request that the former initiate an an-
titrust law enforcement in order to remedy conduct in its territory 
that is substantially and adversely affecting the latter’s interests.  In 
addition, the requested country is urged to take whatever remedial 
action it deems appropriate on a voluntary basis and in consideration 
of its own legitimate interests.42  The United States in fact recently en-
tered into a bilateral agreement concerning positive comity with the 
European Union (EU).43  This agreement seems to be aimed at taking 
over the role of extraterritorial application of antitrust law, in particu-
lar, for export-restraint cases.44  In addition, the United States re-
cently took the initiative by leading discussions of positive comity in-
 
ordination of action,” in the extraterritorial application of Member countries’ competition law 
and encouraging “consultation and conciliation” to deal with complaints of anticompetitive 
practices through indigenous competition law). 
 39. Such bilateral agreements were concluded with, for instance, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
the European Commission, Germany, Israel, Japan, and Mexico.  See, e.g., Agreement Relating 
to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, U.S.-F.R.G., 27 
U.S.T. 1956; Agreement  Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, U.S.-
Austl., 34 U.S.T. 388. 
 40. In fact, bilateral cooperation occurred in a few cases between the United States and 
other trading partners, e.g., the European Union (EU) and Canada.  In these cases, however, 
both parties had a mutual interest in resolving the dispute.  Thus, these are not cases where the 
United States successfully sought cooperation from other trading partners in regard to a unilat-
eral application of U.S. antitrust law to foreign activities.  For a summary of these examples, see 
OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy, CLP Report on Positive Comity, OECD 
Doc. DAFFE/CLP(99)19, ¶¶ 46–49 (June 14, 1999) [hereinafter Report on Positive Comity]. 
 41. See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
 42. For an overview and definition of “positive comity,” see generally Report on Positive 
Comity, supra note 40. 
 43. Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United 
States of America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their 
Competition Laws, 1998 O.J. (L173) 28 [hereinafter Positive Comity Agreement]. 
 44. Press Release, FTC, United States and European Communities Sign Agreement on 
“Positive Comity” in Antitrust Enforcement (June 4, 1998), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/ 
06/positive.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2004). 
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side the OECD and has tried to build consensus for an international 
agreement on positive comity.45 
What is the underlying reason for the United States’ persistence 
in seeking extraterritorial application or arrangements for the inter-
national enforcement of antitrust law?  Most fundamentally, this per-
sistence is due to the divergent features characterizing substantive 
standards and enforcement levels of antitrust laws in individual coun-
tries.  If all countries had identical substantive rules and levels of anti-
trust enforcement pursuant to a multilaterally agreed upon norm, no 
country would have any reason to apply its own antitrust law or to re-
sort to positive comity.  It strongly suggests that the United States 
should take a serious interest in pursuing a multilateral framework 
agreement on competition policy, even if just for the sake of address-
ing its own trade-related competition concerns. 
2. Historical Evolution of Trade Law. It is generally accepted 
that the first trade-related multilateral legal instrument in the modern 
sense is the GATT 1947, which was born under the Bretton Woods 
system.  This system originally envisioned the International Trade 
Organization (ITO) as an institution dealing with trade liberaliza-
tion.46  The so-called Havana Charter of the ITO not only dealt with 
public trade barriers but also addressed restrictive business practices 
functioning as private trade barriers.47  Nevertheless, the Havana 
Charter did not enter into force, as there were only a few countries 
that actually ratified it.  Thus, the GATT 1947, which was originally 
intended for only provisional application until the birth of the ITO, 
began to form the basis of the new multilateral trading system.  The 
GATT 1947 was mainly concerned with the lowering of tariffs and the 
abolition of non-tariff trade barriers.48  These concerns were ad-
dressed to a great extent throughout a series of trade negotiations, 
especially in the Uruguay Round (UR).49 
However, the GATT system addressed only public trade barri-
ers, not private trade barriers arising from anticompetitive practices 
 
 45. See, e.g., Report on Positive Comity, supra note 40. 
 46. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 278–84, 293–98 (3d ed. 1995). 
 47. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, 1948 Can. T.S. 
No. 32, at 3, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2004).  The Havana Charter Chapter 5 has 9 Articles (arts. 46–54) under the title 
of “Restrictive Business Practices.”  
 48. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 46, at 298. 
 49. See supra note 5. 
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by private businesses.  For instance, international cartels or anticom-
petitive practices by multinational companies were not addressed un-
der the GATT system.  Now that the UR has established the WTO 
and has expanded its scope of trade norms, the issue of private trade 
barriers has emerged once again.  Assume that tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers had been abolished.  Even so, if private enterprises collec-
tively engaged in exclusionary practices against foreign competition 
without any governmental regulations, the success of the 
WTO/GATT system in eliminating public trade barriers would be-
come meaningless.  This is why the issue of how to address private 
trade barriers has drawn special attention.  In other words, with in-
creasing concerns regarding restrictive business practices functioning 
as trade barriers, trade law and policy began to show a special interest 
regarding the private restrictive business practices that had formerly 
been the exclusive domain of competition law and policy.50   
Here one can raise the question of whether, and to what extent, 
the current WTO system can contribute to eliminating private trade 
barriers.  First, this question can be rephrased as whether, and to 
what extent, current disciplines under the WTO Agreement can ad-
dress anticompetitive business practices.  Obviously, there is no spe-
cial agreement under the WTO that deals exclusively and directly 
with restrictive business practices.  It is true that a few provisions of 
some individual agreements under the WTO address restrictive busi-
ness practices to some extent.51  However, such provisions are nor-
mally declaratory in their legal nature, and therefore it is generally 
regarded as difficult to invoke such provisions in WTO dispute set-
tlement.  Thus, the WTO system as it currently exists appears to be an 
ineffective option to address restrictive business practices.52 
 
 50. For a discussion of this trend, see infra Part IV.B–C. 
 51. Relevant provisions of the covered agreements include: Article 8.1 of the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade; Article 2 of the Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection; Article 
3.5 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994; Article 15.5 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; Arti-
cles 11.1(b) and 11.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards; Articles 8 and 9 of the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services; Article 40 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property; and Article 9 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Investment 
Measures.  For a discussion of these provisions, see generally OECD Joint Group on Trade and 
Competition, Competition Elements in International Trade Agreements: A Post Uruguay Round 
Overview of WTO Agreements, OECD Doc. COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(98)26/FINAL (Jan. 29, 
1999). 
 52. The WTO Competition Working Group discussed this option and reached a similar 
conclusion.  See WTO Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition, 
Competition-Related Provisions in Existing WTO Agreements, WGTC2RV1 (June 17, 1997). 
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Another possibility would be to apply WTO disciplines to the 
governmental measures that promote restrictive business practices.  
This possibility was tested in the Kodak–Fuji Film dispute.53  Argua-
bly, such practices or measures could be violations of required WTO 
obligations.  In practice, however, as the WTO panel in the Kodak–
Fuji Film dispute illustrates, there are still many obstacles to over-
come in order to challenge anticompetitive practices under the 
GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures.54 
Because of such difficulties and the limits of the present WTO 
system in dealing with private trade barriers, establishing a new WTO 
agreement that would directly address anticompetitive practices 
would be a better approach.  An example of such an agreement may 
be called a Market Access Code or a Trade-Related Competition 
Code that directly and explicitly deals with the anticompetitive prac-
tices that have restrictive effects on market access, possibly modeled 
on the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS Agreement).55 
The foregoing analysis illustrates how trade law and policy have 
theoretically and historically interacted with competition law. What 
follows is a historical overview showing how the issue of the interac-
tion between trade and competition policy has actually emerged be-
low the surface of relevant international institutional settings. 
III.  A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL 
DEBATES ON THE INTERACTION ISSUE 
The OECD began the discussion on the interaction between 
trade and competition laws and policies in the early 1980s.56  At that 
time, the discussion focused on how to facilitate bilateral cooperation 
for the international application of competition law.57  Thereafter, the 
 
 53. See generally Dispute Settlement Body Panel Report on Japan—Measures Affecting 
Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998), reprinted in 5 BERNAN’S 
ANNOTATED REP. 27 (1999) [hereinafter Japan—Film and Paper]. 
 54. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 55. For discussions of these models, see generally Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust 
and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 14, n.72 (1997). 
 56. See generally COMPETITION AND TRADE POLICIES, supra note 2; see also WTO Com-
petition Working Group, Communication from the OECD, WT/WGTCP/W/21, ¶ 2 (July 29, 
1997). 
 57. For a general description of this move, see Maria-Chiara Malaguti, Restrictive Business 
Practices in International Trade and the Role of the World Trade Organization, J. WORLD 
TRADE, Vol. 32, No. 3, June 1998, at 117 (1998). 
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discussion subjects were expanded to include the interaction between 
trade law and policy and competition law and policy. 
In the middle of the Uruguay Round negotiations, which began 
in the late 1980s, the EC for the first time officially voiced the need 
for the discussion of competition-related matters.58  In effect, the EC 
claimed that the absence of an agreement on competition-related is-
sues would only lead to a partial fulfillment of the goal of liberalizing 
trade under the multilateral trading system.  To that end, the EC pro-
posed addressing competition issues under the umbrella of the WTO, 
pointing to the fact that anticompetitive practices may function as 
private trade barriers.59  In addition, a scholarly group, called the Mu-
nich Group, submitted a draft International Antitrust Code to the 
Uruguay Round negotiation forum for consideration as a draft pluri-
lateral agreement to be incorporated into the WTO Agreement.60  
Yet this draft code was never put on any official negotiation table, 
and any gains in the Uruguay Round negotiations vis-à-vis competi-
tion policy were limited to a few provisions addressing competition-
related matters that were individually inserted into the covered 
agreements of the WTO.61 
The EC’s efforts have continued, however, after the birth of the 
WTO.  While preparing for the Singapore Ministerial Conference 
held in December 1996, the EC again argued for discussing competi-
tion-related issues in the WTO and, ultimately, for formulating a mul-
tilateral agreement on trade-related competition policies.62  The so-
called “Like-Minded Countries” supported the EC’s position.63  The 
Like-Minded Countries include—in addition to the EC—Japan, Ko-
 
 58. Leon Brittan, A Framework for International Competition, Address at World Compe-
tition Forum (Feb. 3, 1992), reprinted in 3 INT’L ECON. INSIGHTS 21 (1992). 
 59. For a similar proposal, see WTO Competition Working Group, Communication by the 
European Community and its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/62, ¶¶ 12–13 (Mar. 5, 1998). 
 60. For further elaboration of this “Munich Code” see Special Report: International Anti-
trust Code Will be Studied by GATT Members, 65 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 259 
(1993).  See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Competition-Oriented Reforms of the WTO World 
Trade System—Proposals and Trade Options, in TOWARDS WTO COMPETITION RULES 43, 48–
49 (Roger Zäch ed., 1999). 
 61. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 62. WTO Competition Working Group, Communication from the European Community 
and Its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/152, ¶¶ 1–4 (Sept. 25, 2000). 
 63. See generally WTO Competition Working Group, Communication from the European 
Community and Its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/78 (July 7, 1998); WTO Competition Work-
ing Group, Communication from Japan, WT/WGTCP/W/92 (Sept. 21, 1998); WTO Competition 
Working Group, Communication from the Republic of Korea, WT/WGTCP/W/90 (Sept. 3, 
1998); WTO Competition Working Group, Communication from Hong Kong, China, 
WT/WGTCP/W/85 (Aug. 27, 1998). 
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rea, Switzerland, Norway, Canada, and Hungary.  The Like-Minded 
Countries, however, did not share the same view on whether to deal 
with antidumping measures in the same forum where the interaction 
between trade and competition policy would be discussed or how 
such a discussion should proceed.  In other words, whereas the EC 
took the modest view that this issue need not be included in the work-
ing agenda for the WTO Competition Working Group, other Like-
Minded Countries—such as Japan, Korea, and Hong Kong, in par-
ticular—aggressively argued for the inclusion of antidumping issues 
among the items to be included in the WTO Competition Working 
Group’s mandate.64  Essentially, the latter countries attempted to take 
advantage of this forum to implement fundamental reform in the cur-
rent antidumping regimes under the WTO by addressing the anti-
competitive aspects of antidumping measures.65 
The United States has not ruled out the possibility of the WTO’s 
role in the area of competition policy, but is very hesitant to engage in 
negotiations on competition policy as a separate item for a possible 
future agreement under the WTO system.66  This hesitancy on the 
part of the United States is not without reason.  Above all, if anti-
dumping issues were to be included in the discussion items, this inclu-
sion would not necessarily benefit the United States in light of the 
well-known fact that the United States has traditionally enforced an-
tidumping measures more than any other WTO Member.67  In addi-
tion, the United States seems to be concerned that the codification of 
competition rules at the WTO level would result in the contamination 
of antitrust “purity” and a compromise in substantive standards for 
antitrust regulations so as to make them available for other develop-
 
 64. See generally documents referenced supra note 63. 
 65. See Seung Wha Chang, Like Father, Like Son: A Progeny of the Antidumping Model 
for the Shipbuilding Industry, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 807, 819 (2003). 
 66. The then Acting Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Joel Klein, made this posi-
tion clear in his speech right before the opening of the Singapore Ministerial Conference.  See 
Joel I. Klein, A Note of Caution with Respect to a WTO Agenda on Competition Policy, Re-
marks before the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Nov. 18, 1996), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/jikspch.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2004); see also WTO 
Competition Working Group, Communication from the United States, WT/WGTCP/W/88 (Aug. 
28, 1998). 
 67. From 1995 to the first half of 2003, the United States has reported 308 Antidumping 
Notifications to the WTO.  This is more than any other member except India, which reported 
344 Antidumping Notifications during that period.  Statistics on Antidumping Notifications are 
available at the World Trade Organization’s website, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
adp_e/adp_stattab2_e.xls (last visited Jan. 10, 2004). 
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ing countries.68  Many developing countries have no competition law 
at all or adopt relatively lenient standards for domestic competition 
law.69  Further, the United States appears to take the position that, 
compared to multilateral negotiations at the WTO, alternative legal 
tools, all either unilateral or bilateral in nature, can more realistically 
and effectively resolve competition-related trade concerns.70  Such 
tools include the extraterritorial application of antitrust law, the com-
petition clause of Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act,71 the WTO dis-
pute settlement procedures, and bilateral cooperation for interna-
tional enforcement—for instance, positive comity.72  As shown in Part 
IV, U.S. antitrust authorities actually have implemented such tools, 
without much success. 
Developing countries appear to be in agreement with the United 
States in their stance on the negotiation of competition policy at the 
WTO, but for differing reasons.  In general, developing countries be-
lieve that it is too early for them to participate in multilateral negotia-
tions on competition policy at a time when most have not yet enacted 
domestic competition law, and the limited body that does exist in 
these countries is at an early, incipient stage.73  On the other side of 
the coin, however, developing countries could take advantage of this 
opportunity to discuss competition issues at the WTO in order to set 
the legal framework for regulating anticompetitive activities of those 
multinational corporations that have had an adverse effect on their 
domestic markets.74  In any event, developing countries seem to have 
 
 68. See Klein, supra note 66.  Klein also stated that “we must guard against a lowest-
common-denominator outcome in the development of competition rules by the WTO.”  Id. 
 69. Among the WTO members, around eighty members have adopted some type of com-
petition law.  See Julian L. Clarke & Simon J. Evenett, A Multilateral Framework for Competi-
tion Policy, in THE SINGAPORE ISSUES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE ROAD TO 
CANCUN AND BEYOND 77, 84–87 (State Secretariat of Economic Affairs & Simon J. Evenett 
eds., 2003), http://www.worldtradeinstitute.ch/research/The%20Singapore%20Issues.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2004). 
 70. For more recent speeches of U.S. antitrust officials that reconfirmed this position, see 
generally Fox, supra note 55. 
 71. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 72. See infra Part IV. 
 73. See, e.g., WTO Competition Working Group, Report on the Meeting of 10–11 June 
1999, WT/WGTCP/M/9, ¶¶ 30–31 (Aug. 4, 1999). 
 74. See, e.g., WTO Competition Working Group, Report on the Meeting of 27 and 28 No-
vember 1997, WT/WGTCP/M/3, ¶ 22 (Feb. 26, 1998); WTO Competition Working Group, Sub-
mission by the European Community and Its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/45, ¶¶ 6–7 (Nov. 
24, 1997). 
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some reservations at the moment about moving towards the negotia-
tion of a multilateral agreement on competition law and policy.75 
Against this background, issues on the interaction between trade 
and competition policy at the WTO were the subject of heated debate 
at the Doha Ministerial Conference.76  Not surprisingly, the EC had 
submitted various proposals to the WTO Competition Working 
Group and took a leading role.77  The Like-Minded Countries basi-
cally agreed with the EC, but argued for the inclusion of antidumping 
issues.78  The United States obviously disagreed and reconfirmed its 
pessimistic view of the WTO’s ability to effectively deal with competi-
tion policy matters as an independent subject for future negotiations.79  
During the final stage in its preparation for the Doha Ministerial 
Conference, the United States conceded somewhat and agreed to dis-
cuss the interaction between trade and competition policy at the 
WTO, while assuming that antidumping issues would not be discussed 
at this competition-related negotiation.80  Japan and other Like-
Minded Countries took a more flexible approach and accepted the 
U.S. proposal that the Doha Declaration not explicitly mention anti-
dumping issues under the negotiation item Interaction Between 
Trade and Policy.  This compromise made it possible for WTO Mem-
bers to agree on the language of the Ministerial Conference, in par-
ticular, Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy.81 
 
 75. See, e.g., WTO Competition Working Group, Communication from Colombia, 
WT/WGTCP/W/162, ¶¶ 3–6, 9–12 (July 3, 2001). 
 76. See Investment, Competition Proposals from EU and Japan Face New Attack, INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE, Nov. 11, 2001. 
 77. See generally WTO Competition Working Group, Communication from the European 
Community and Its Member States, supra note 62. 
 78. See WTO Competition Working Group, Communication from the European Commu-
nity and Its Member States, supra note 63; WTO Stalled in Effort to Resolve Declaration Differ-
ences, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 13, 2001. 
 79. See U.S. Official Downplays EU Priority Issues in New WTO Negotiations, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE, Nov. 9, 2001. 
 80. U.S. opinion on antidumping and competition policy can be found at USTR, THE 
PRESIDENT’S 1999 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, in 2000 TRADE 
POLICY AGENDA AND 1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON 
THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 27, 135–37 (2000), http://www.ustr.gov/wto/99ustrrpt/ 
ustr99_wgtcp.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2004). 
 81. In addition, the U.S. successfully inserted into a section of the Doha Ministerial Decla-
ration on WTO Rules the following language: 
In the light of experience and of the increasing application of these instruments by 
Members, we agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines under 
the Agreements on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures, while preserving the basic concepts, principles and effec-
tiveness of these Agreements and their instruments and objectives, and taking into ac-
count the needs of developing and least-developed participants. 
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As with recent progress in the WTO Competition Working 
Group’s work under the Doha mandate, the United States seems to 
realize that there is some merit to the WTO’s work on competition 
policy matters.82  Nevertheless, the United States still appears to per-
ceive the role of the WTO in this regard as a supplementary means to 
facilitate unilateral or bilateral efforts to enforce U.S. antitrust laws.  
In the Cancun Ministerial Conference, the United States clearly took 
a pessimistic view on building WTO Member consensus on the mo-
dalities of future negotiations on the interaction between trade and 
competition policy.83  This position can also be observed in recent 
U.S. activities relating to international competition policy outside the 
WTO context.  While arguing that the “competition culture” is a pre-
condition for negotiating any competition-related rules in a multilat-
eral setting, in 2001 the United States established, outside the purview 
of the WTO, an international forum called the International Compe-
tition Network (ICN), under which international competition issues 
are discussed.84  The International Competition Policy Advisory 
Committee, established in 1997 as an advisory body to the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ), conducted a two year 
research program and submitted a lengthy report on competition pol-
icy for international operations.85  It recommended establishing an in-
ternational body under U.S. leadership.86  The ICN is aimed at dis-
cussing purely antitrust matters and is a project- and result-oriented 
forum.  The result of such discussions would normally be in the form 
 
Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 9, ¶ 28 (emphasis added).  This language makes it very 
difficult to provide a voice for the fundamental reform of antidumping regimes even in the ne-
gotiation forum for interaction between trade and competition policy. 
 82. See WTO Competition Working Group, Communication from the United States,  
WT/WGTCP/W/204, ¶ 8 (Aug. 15, 2002); see also Alexander Schaub, Cooperation in 
Competition Policy Enforcement between the EU and the U.S. and New Concepts Evolving at 
the World Trade Organization and the International Competition Network, Speech before the 
Mentor Group of the European Commission (Apr. 4, 2002), at 4–5, at http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2002_013_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2004). 
 83. See Latest Declaration, supra note 15. 
 84. The International Competition Network (ICN), Network of Competition Law Authori-
ties established in 2001, will seek to provide antitrust authorities with a specialized yet informal 
venue for maintaining regular contacts and addressing practical competition issues.  The focus 
will be on improving world-wide cooperation and on enhancing convergence through focussed 
dialogue.  The ICN website includes information about the Network, Working Group details, 
Member information, Conference information, news and events, and a subscription service at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2004). 
 85. See Merit E. Janow et al., Open letter of February 28, 2000, introducing the FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 1. 
 86. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 281–85. 
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of non-binding guidelines or recommendations of model practices.87  
Currently, the ICN is focusing on the convergence of transborder 
merger review mechanisms and the antitrust agency’s competition 
advocacy role.88  Although the ICN’s mission would not appear to 
cover trade issues, the prominent role of the United States in the ICN 
clearly indicates that it would prefer solving international competition 
issues outside the purview of the WTO. 
The foregoing analysis indicates that, unless the United States 
changes its negative or passive attitude towards a multilateral nego-
tiation on the interaction between trade and competition policy, it 
would be unrealistic for the WTO to successfully move forward to 
launch such a multilateral negotiation.  In order to persuade the 
United States to change its position, it is first necessary to show why 
other non-WTO alternative policy tools, which the United States has 
relied upon thus far, cannot be valid options to effectively address 
U.S. trade concerns arising at the interface between trade and compe-
tition policy.  Part IV takes on such a mission. 
IV.  ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES  
AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
A. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law 
Until recently, the United States’ extraterritorial application of 
antitrust law had been based on two jurisdictional rules, one being the 
“effects doctrine”89 and the other being the “jurisdictional rule of rea-
son.”90  However, the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in the 
Hartford Insurance case seemed to adopt the effects doctrine, with 
 
 87. For a summary of the ICN’s goal and its progress by the present Deputy Assistant At-
torney General for Antitrust, see Majoras supra note 23. 
 88. President’s Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Organization and Competition 
Policy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 541, 580 (2002).  See also  supra note 87. 
 89. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443–44 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(“[It] is settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its 
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the 
state reprehends; and these liabilities other sates will ordinarily recognize.”). 
 90. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613–15 (9th Cir. 1976), 
aff’d, 749 F.2d 1378, 1382–86 (9th Cir. 1984).  The core element of this jurisdictional rule of rea-
son is that it requires the U.S. court to consider not only the U.S. interest in exercising jurisdic-
tion, but also foreign interests that may be adversely affected by the U.S. court’s exercise of its 
jurisdiction.  See James G. Park, Extraterritorial Impact of the United States Antitrust Laws and 
Commercial Bribery Considerations, 1 DICK. J. INT’L L. 105, 108 (1982). 
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strong dissenting opinions.91  In any event, the currently prevailing 
rule is that even if the illegal act occurs outside U.S. jurisdiction, if it 
has a direct, serious and foreseeable effect on U.S. trade, and the ac-
tor intended this consequence, U.S. courts can exercise jurisdiction 
over such actions.92 
Extraterritorial application of antitrust law normally occurs in 
cases where anticompetitive practices within foreign jurisdictions ad-
versely affect U.S. markets and U.S. consumers.  The DOJ, in its An-
titrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations of 1988 
declared in a footnote that “the Department is concerned only with 
adverse effects on competition that would harm U.S. consumers by 
reducing output or raising prices.”93  However, in 1992 the DOJ 
dropped footnote 159 and declared that extraterritorial application 
would also be possible in cases where an anticompetitive activity 
harms U.S exporters’ interests, for example, when the activity func-
tions as a private trade barrier to U.S. exports into a foreign market, 
whether or not there is direct harm to U.S. consumers.94  The 1995 
DOJ/FTC Guidelines also confirmed this position.95  In this connec-
tion, one needs to look at the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement 
Act of 1982 (FTAIA).96  The FTAIA set the outer limit of U.S. court 
jurisdiction over competition-related conduct involving trade or 
commerce.  In the case of a U.S. enterprises’ exports, U.S. antitrust 
law would apply if the anticompetitive conduct has a direct, substan-
tial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on such export trade.97  It 
 
 91. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764 (1993).  Some scholars take the view 
that this Supreme Court decision did not exclude the possibility to apply jurisdictional rule of 
reason in different future cases.  See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 42, 49 (1995). 
 92. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443–44.  The 1995 DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES also state that if the 
concerned action (1) has a “direct, serious and reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S. exports of 
goods and services, and (2) is subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, the U.S. will apply its 
own antitrust law.  1995 DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 34, § 3.122. 
 93. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL 
OPERATIONS, reprinted in 55 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at S-21 n.159 (Spec. 
Supp. 1988) [hereinafter 1988 GUIDELINES]. 
 94. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Policy Statement Regarding An-
ticompetitive Conduct That Restricts U.S. Exports: Statement of Antitrust Policy (Apr. 3, 1992), 
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,108. 
 95. 1995 DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 34, § 3.112. 
 96. FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000). 
 97. FTAIA Section 6a provides as follows: 
[The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than 
import trade or commerce) with foreign nations unless (1) such conduct has a direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect: (A) on trade or commerce which is not 
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should be noted, however, that the FTAIA deals with jurisdictional 
matters only, not the substantive rules for determining the illegality of 
contested activities.98 
When addressing market-restraint cases involving U.S. exporters’ 
interests, the 1995 DOJ/FTC Guidelines do not make a distinction be-
tween jurisdictional rules and substantive rules.99  In other words, U.S. 
antitrust authorities seem to take the position that the substantive 
rules of U.S. antitrust law can successfully apply to export-restraint 
cases without difficulty.  In the author’s view, the position of the U.S. 
antitrust authorities is wrong.  There arise serious theoretical and 
practical problems when extraterritorial application is to be under-
taken with the purpose of safeguarding the interests of U.S. exporting 
companies rather than U.S. consumers. 
First, this position is not consistent with the objective of U.S. an-
titrust laws to preserve and to foster competition and thereby pro-
mote consumers’ interests.100  In this context, “consumers” mean U.S. 
consumers.  Should the U.S. antitrust law apply to conduct affecting 
U.S. export commerce for the purpose of opening foreign markets, it 
would be inconsistent with the basic objective of U.S. antitrust law, 
since relevant consumers in such cases are normally foreign consum-
ers in foreign markets.  U.S. consumers are normally irrelevant in this 
export-restraint context.101  The only relevant U.S. interest is an op-
portunity for U.S. enterprises to increase their export activity in for-
eign markets.  However, U.S. antitrust law is intended to protect con-
sumers’ interests by promoting competition; yet it would not serve 
that purpose when it is used solely to protect U.S. businesses in inter-
national competition.102  Therefore, it can be concluded that extrater-
ritorial application of U.S. antitrust law cannot be legitimately sus-
tained when it is applied to export-restraint cases, unless the interests 
 
trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with 
foreign nations; or (B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a 
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; (2) such effect gives 
rise to a claim under the provisions of [the Sherman Act], other than this section. 
The FTAIA also amended the jurisdictional rules of the Federal Trade Commission Act.  See 15 
U.S.C. 45(a)(3) (2000). 
 98. See H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 13 (1982). 
 99. See 1995 DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 34, § 3.112. 
 100. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); see also Spectrum Sports, Inc. 
v. McQuillan, 506 U.S 447, 458 (1993). 
 101. For the same criticism of the 1995 DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES, see Report on Positive Com-
ity, supra note 40, ¶ 41. 
 102. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). 
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of U.S. consumers are affected.103  Should the U.S. court change its 
traditional rules and affirmatively apply U.S. antitrust law to export-
restraint cases in order to protect U.S. exporters’ access to foreign 
markets, it would not be able to avoid criticism that it has adopted 
double standards in antitrust enforcement.  The 1995 DOJ/FTC 
Guidelines do not explicitly address this point, however, it is worth 
noting that they do declare the following principles: 
The Agencies do not discriminate in the enforcement of the anti-
trust laws on the basis of the nationality of the parties.  Nor do the 
Agencies employ their statutory authority to further non-antitrust 
goals.  Once jurisdictional requirements, comity, and doctrines of 
foreign governmental involvement have been considered and satis-
fied, the same substantive rules apply to all cases.104 
According to the principles above, there should not be double stan-
dards for domestic and extraterritorial applications.  In addition, it 
should be noted that Diane Wood, then Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General for DOJ, Antitrust Division, stated that although antitrust 
enforcement may contribute to opening foreign markets in the long 
run, this effect is only an incidental result and should be differentiated 
from the basic objectives of antitrust law.105  In her own words, the ul-
timate goal of antitrust law is to serve “consumer welfare, allocative 
efficiency, or the protection of competitive process, not particular 
competitors.”106  More recently, Wood’s successors reconfirmed this 
position, while declaring that the purpose of antitrust law is to 
“[p]rotect competition, not competitors.”107  Lastly, one should note 
 
 103. In practice, it would seem extremely unlikely for export-restraint cases to involve the 
interests of U.S. consumers. 
 104. 1995 DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 34, § 2, pmbl.  It is interesting that these prin-
ciples were added to the final text of the 1995 DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES after receiving comments 
on the draft Guidelines that they might serve non-antitrust goals, for instance, protecting U.S. 
exporters’ trade interest. 
 105. Diane P. Wood, Antitrust: A Remedy for Trade Barriers?, Address at the International 
Conference sponsored by the University of Washington Asian Law Program and Japan Infor-
mation Access Project (Mar. 24, 1995), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/950324dw.txt  
(last visited Jan. 10, 2004). 
 106. Id.  Wood confirmed her position in another place.  See Diane P. Wood, The 1995 Anti-
trust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations: An Introduction, Address at the 
ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting (Apr. 5, 1995) (“Speculation or assumptions that anti-
trust enforcement can somehow incorporate non-antitrust goals are either misguided or wrong.  
Only when we believe that a substantive antitrust violation has occurred—either in domestic or 
foreign commerce—do we act.”), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/950405dw.htm 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2004). 
 107. See Majoras, supra note 23.  While citing relevant Supreme Court Decisions, such as 
Northern Pacific Railway, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) and Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. 447 (1993), the for-
mer Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Division, Charles A. James also expressed the 
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that the 1995 DOJ/FTC Guidelines are exactly that—mere guidelines.  
They are not the law itself, and therefore, they are not binding upon 
the court.108  The foregoing analysis suggests that although the United 
States has jurisdiction over export-restraint cases under the FTAIA, 
contested conduct would rarely violate U.S. antitrust law since such 
conduct normally does not affect U.S. consumers’ interests. 
As a practical matter, foreign governments would likely be un-
willing to cooperate with U.S. antitrust authorities in such matters as 
export-restraint cases that involve their own consumers’ interests.109  
It would be very difficult for the extraterritorial application of anti-
trust law to be successful without cooperation on the part of the for-
eign countries in which anticompetitive practices occurred.  For in-
stance, relevant evidence is normally within the territories of foreign 
countries.  Moreover, even after obtaining favorable court judgments 
in the United States, it would likely be impossible to enforce such 
judgments within the foreign jurisdiction without the cooperation of 
foreign governments. 
In light of the theoretical and practical limitations discussed 
above, it is not surprising that one can hardly find an example of the 
extraterritorial application of antitrust law to export-restraint cases.110  
Although the United States did not openly admit such limitations, it 
has resorted to other policy options.  The Kodak–Fuji Film dispute is 
a typical example of an export-restraint case where the United States 
actually resorted to the use of Section 301 rather than the extraterri-
torial application of its antitrust law. 
 
same position.  See supra note 23 (stating that “no principle is more central to U.S. law than that 
antitrust protects competition, not competitors” and that “the purpose of the antitrust laws ‘is 
not to protect business from the working of the market; it is to protect the public from failure of 
the market’”). 
 108. 1995 DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 34, § 1 (“[The 1995 Guidelines] are intended 
to provide antitrust guidance to businesses engaged in international operations on questions 
that relate specifically to the Agencies’ international enforcement policy.”). 
 109. For instance, there are many countries that have legislation which blocks extraterrito-
rial application of foreign laws.  The United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, Can-
ada, New Zealand, and Australia have such blocking statutes.  For a more detailed review of 
these statutes, see generally Carl A. Cira, Jr., The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block American 
Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT’L L. 247 (1982). 
 110. Some cite the Pilkington Case, United States v. Pilkington PLC, 1994-2 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 70,842 (D. Ariz. 1994), as an example.  However, it is not an appropriate example be-
cause the anticompetitive practices at issue in this case directly affected the U.S. market as well, 
and consequently the protection of U.S. exports was not the sole purpose of the extraterritorial 
application of antitrust law in this case.  In other words, in this case, the relevant market was the 
worldwide market. 
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B. The Competition Clause of Section 301 
U.S. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is the United States’ 
most powerful weapon to open foreign markets when it perceives that 
unfair foreign trade practices are restricting U.S. exports.111  Section 
301 had been reinforced by a series of amendments until the 1994 
Uruguay Round Agreement Act.  The basic structure of Section 301 
may be summarized as follows: First, if a foreign state denies the 
rights of the United States arising from a trade agreement, or if a for-
eign act, policy or practice violates or is not in conformity with trade 
agreements or denies the interests of the United States, or is unjusti-
fiable and burdens or restricts U.S. trade, the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive (USTR) is required to take action under Section 301.112  Second, 
if a foreign act, policy or practice is unreasonable or discriminatory 
and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, the USTR may take action 
under Section 301.113 
 The wording in Section 301 that has relevance to competition 
policy is “unreasonable” foreign actions, policies or practices.  In an 
attempt to utilize Section 301 to supplement antitrust law as a way of 
eliminating restrictive business practices and thereby opening foreign 
markets, a 1988 amendment expanded the scope of the definition of 
“unreasonable.”  The definition now includes toleration by foreign 
governments of systematic anticompetitive activities by private enter-
prises in the foreign country that have the effect of restricting access 
of U.S. exports to a foreign market.114  In a recent amendment under 
 
 111. See Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000). 
 112. Id. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a).  There are of course exceptions to this mandate.  Therefore, the 
USTR does retain some discretion in applying measures under Section 301. 
 113. Id. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b). 
 114. Id. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B) reads in relevant part: 
(B) Acts, policies and practices that are unreasonable include, but are not limited to, 
any act, policy, or practice, or any combination of acts, policies, or practices, which 
(i)  denies fair and equitable 
. . . . 
(IV) market opportunities, including the toleration by a foreign government of sys-
tematic anticompetitive activities by enterprises or among enterprises in the foreign 
country that have the effect of restricting, on a basis that is inconsistent with commer-
cial considerations, access of United States goods or services to a foreign market. 
One of the proposals for the 1988 amendment was to define anticompetitive activities by private 
enterprises as violations of Section 301.  However, facing criticisms that this would impair the 
nature of Section 301 as a trade norm, such a proposal failed to reach Congress.  See Judith 
Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A Legislative History of the 
Amendment to Section 301, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM 49, 73–74 (Jagdish Bhagwati & 
Hugh Patrick eds., 1990). 
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the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement Act, the Clinton administration 
further strengthened this aspect of the competition clause.115 
Nonetheless, the competition clause of Section 301 had not actu-
ally been invoked until the 1994 Japan–U.S. Auto Parts case.116  
Shortly after the resolution of this case in July of 1995, the USTR in-
voked Section 301 on the ground that the Japanese government had 
tolerated anticompetitive actions by Fuji, such as restricting distribu-
tion channels that limited the access of Kodak film exports into the 
Japanese market.117  In the end, this Section 301 investigation was 
frustrated because the Japanese government argued that since the 
WTO system did not directly address competition policy matters, 
such issues remained a matter of domestic sovereignty.  In the same 
vein, because the United States touched on domestic Japanese issues 
with unilateral measures such as Section 301, the Japanese govern-
ment decided not to respond to any requests from the United States 
under the Section 301 procedures.118  At the same time, the Japanese 
government initiated antitrust investigation procedures under its own 
antitrust law, concluding that the challenged practices did not violate 
its antitrust law.119  As noted, the competition clause of Section 301 
can be invoked only when there is “toleration” by the foreign gov-
ernment of activities in violation of such foreign country’s antitrust 
law.  Since the Japanese government formally investigated and then 
concluded that no violation of Japanese antitrust law existed, it was 
difficult to interpret such a situation as “toleration” under the compe-
 
 115. See Statement of Administrative Action Accompanying the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 656, 1027–36 (Sept. 27, 1994), available at 
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/copyrights/Selected%20Provisions%20of%20the 
%20Statement%20of%20Administrative%20Act.pdf (last visited Jan. 10 2004). 
 116. Initiation of Section 302 Investigation and Request for Public Comment: Barriers to 
Access to the Auto Parts Replacement Market in Japan, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,034 (Oct. 13, 1994) 
(“[Japanese regulations] support and work in combination with market restrictive practices by 
Japanese auto companies and parts distributors substantially to limit foreign access . . . .”).  See 
also USTR, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 36, at 97; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, JAPAN: 1994 
COUNTRY REPORT ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE PRACTICES BUREAU OF ECONOMIC 
AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS, at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/economics/trade_reports/1994/ 
Japan.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2004). 
 117. See Section 304 Determinations: Barriers to Access to the Japanese Market for Con-
sumer Photographic Film and Paper, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,929 (June 18, 1996); Initiation of Investiga-
tion Pursuant to Section 302 Concerning Barriers to Access to the Japanese Market for Con-
sumer Photographic Film and Paper, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,447 (July 7, 1995). 
 118. See Japan Will Not Negotiate Fuji Case Under Section 301, Hashimoto Says, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE, Sept. 20, 1995. 
 119. See JFTC Report Finds Japan Film Market Free of Anticompetitive Practices, INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE, July, 25, 1997, at 10–11. 
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tition clause unless the Japanese government decision was clearly 
contrary to its own law. 
This case illustrates the inherent weakness of the competition 
clause of Section 301 in addressing U.S. exporters’ market access con-
cerns.  Faced with the inadequacy of the Section 301 competition 
clause, the United States turned to another option—the WTO dispute 
settlement procedures.120 
C. WTO Dispute Settlement and Competition Issues 
As noted, the extraterritorial application of antitrust law and the 
Section 301 competition clause were found to be ineffective tools for 
the resolution of export-restraint cases.  The United States then re-
sorted to the WTO dispute settlement process, hoping to effectively 
address private anticompetitive practices in the Kodak–Fuji Film dis-
pute. 
The most critical issue in this case was whether a “non-violation 
complaint” under GATT Article XXIII.1(b)121 could be a valid chan-
nel for subjecting competition-related governmental measures to 
WTO dispute settlement in general.  This legal question remains vital 
because no agreement under the WTO framework directly addresses 
competition policy and thus there are no legally binding WTO obliga-
tions for Members to preserve competition.122  The WTO panel made 
 
 120. For the history and legal issues of the Kodak–Fuji Film dispute, see William H. Bar-
ringer, Competition Policy and Cross-Border Dispute Resolution: Lessons Learned from the 
U.S.-Japan Film Dispute, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 459 (1998). 
 121. Article XXIII.1(b) of the GATT, supra note 3, at 39, states as follows: 
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or in-
directly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of 
any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of 
. . . . 
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it con-
flicts with the provisions of this Agreement, . . .  
This action is called “non-violation complaint,” since it does not require proving a violation of 
certain obligations under the GATT.  For a general explanation of the meaning of non-violation 
complaints, see generally JACKSON, supra note 46, at 357–64. 
 122. In this case, the U.S. also invoked violation complaints pursuant to Article XXIII:1(a) 
of the GATT, claiming inconsistencies of contested measures with Article III.4 and Article X:1 
of the GATT.  Nonetheless, in the process of the panel proceedings, both parties noticed that 
the violation complaints would not fit competition-related measures, and instead devoted “the 
lion’s share of their arguments” to non-violation complaints.  See generally Japan—Film and 
Paper, supra note 53, ¶ 10.27.  Not surprisingly, the panel found that the United States failed to 
demonstrate that the contested measures were inconsistent with Article III:4 (requiring that im-
ported products receive “treatment no less favourable” than domestic products) and Article X:1 
(requiring publication and effective administration of “[l]aws, regulations, judicial decisions and 
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it clear that there was no legal reason to disallow the invocation of 
non-violation complaints against competition-related governmental 
measures.123  The text of Article XXIII:1(b) of GATT requires a com-
plaining party to demonstrate three elements in order to prevail on 
non-violation claims: (1) application of a measure by a WTO Mem-
ber, (2) a benefit accruing under the relevant agreement, and (3) nul-
lification or impairment of the benefit as a result of the application of 
the measure.124 
For the first element, the complaining party is required to prove 
the existence of an “application by [a WTO Member] of any meas-
ure,”—a governmental measure.125  Thus, the textual language of Arti-
cle XXIII:1(b) makes it clear that a purely private measure is not sub-
ject to the WTO dispute settlement procedures.  For this reason, the 
United States argued that Fuji’s anticompetitive activities originated 
from government measures, or that at the very least the government 
intervened in such activities.126  The United States pointed largely to 
three types of policies characteristic of the Japanese film market: the 
distribution system; the large store law; and sales restriction meas-
ures.  The panel considered that the mere fact that an action is taken 
by a private party does not necessarily rule out the possibility that 
there exists a governmental measure for purposes of Article 
XXIII:1(b) if there is a sufficient degree of governmental interven-
tion.127  Although the panel tried to envision some objective criteria 
for this determination while endorsing the Japan—Semiconductor 
panel’s ruling, it ultimately held that it was difficult to establish 
bright-line rules in this regard, and suggested examination on a case-
by-case basis.128  The panel’s application of this case-by-case approach 
 
administrative rulings of general application” relating to trade) of the GATT.  Id. ¶¶ 10.402–
10.404. 
 123. Id. ¶¶ 10.38–10.39. 
 124. Id. ¶ 10.61.  The Report cites GATT Dispute Panel Report on European Economic 
Community—Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Re-
lated Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86 (1990); GATT 
Dispute Panel Report on Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, GATT B.I.S.D. (Vol. II) 
at 188, 192–93 (1952).  Id. ¶ 10.61. 
 125. GATT art. XXIII:1(b). 
 126. Japan—Film and Paper, supra note 53, ¶¶ 10.41–10.42. 
 127. See id. ¶¶ 10.52–10.56. 
 128. See id. ¶ 10.56; see also GATT Dispute Panel Report on Japan—Trade in Semi-
Conductors, May 4, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 116 (1989) [hereinafter Japan—Semi-
Conductors].  Under this Japan—Semi-Conductors test, a government measure would exist if an 
anticompetitive activity of a private entity depends upon a governmental decision, and the gov-
ernment provided an incentive for a private entity to carry out such activities.  See Japan—Semi-
Conductors, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.), at ¶ 117.  Even if such two-fold standards were not 
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resulted in the failure of the United States to demonstrate the neces-
sary existence of a government measure in many of the eighteen con-
tested measures.129 
Most fundamentally, the complaining party is not allowed to 
challenge private anticompetitive practices under the WTO dispute 
settlement.  In many cases, anticompetitive practices may occur with-
out any governmental intervention at all, suggesting that the WTO 
dispute settlement regime cannot sufficiently address the origin and 
core elements of trade concerns arising from competition-related 
matters. 
The “governmental measure” requirement of Article XXIII:1(b) 
is merely one example of the inherent limitations of the WTO dispute 
settlement process in addressing competition concerns.  For the sec-
ond element under Article XXIII:1(b), the complaining party is re-
quired to prove that it had legitimate expectations of benefits accru-
ing under the GATT.  Normally, the claimed benefits are those of 
legitimate expectations of improved market-access opportunities aris-
ing from relevant tariff concessions.130  In the Kodak–Fuji Film dis-
pute, the question of this element was complicated by the fact that the 
United States claimed to have had expectations of improved market 
access benefits with respect to several products, granted during three 
successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations.131  
Finally, the complaining party in a non-violation complaint is re-
quired to demonstrate that contested government measures nullified 
or impaired benefits or impeded the attainment of the WTO Agree-
ment’s objective.  Competition-related government measures tend to 
be long-term measures of general application not intended to target a 
specific action, similar to those at issue in the Kodak–Fuji Film dis-
pute.132  Therefore, it is often practically very difficult to prove the 
causal link between such measures and the nullification or impair-
ment of benefits accruing under the GATT/WTO Agreement.  The 
presumption of nullification or impairment of benefits for violation 
complaints is not applicable to non-violation complaints.  Rather, the 
 
met, when the government, while providing the incentive to carry out anticompetitive activities, 
endorses such activities or the activities are attributable to the government, a “government 
measure” would be deemed to exist.  See Japan—Film and Paper, supra note 53, ¶ 10.52. 
 129. See, e.g., Japan—Film and Paper, supra note 53, ¶¶ 10.122, 10.136, 10.148, 10.194 (find-
ing that several U.S. claims did not constitute governmental “measures”). 
 130. Id. ¶ 10.61. 
 131. Id. ¶ 10.63. 
 132. Id. ¶ 10.23. 
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complaining party in non-violation complaints is required to “present 
a detailed justification in support of any complaint relating to a meas-
ure . . . .”133  The burden of proof in this regard is considerably high.134  
Not surprisingly, despite successfully satisfying aspects of the second 
legitimate expectation of benefits requirements, the United States in 
the Kodak-Fuji Film case failed in its efforts to prove the requisite 
causal link for all contested measures.135  In short, one can safely con-
clude that it is practically difficult for the complaining party on non-
violation claims against competition-related governmental measures 
to satisfy all three of the burdensome requirements.136 
As a related matter, it is worth noting that the remedies for this 
non-violation complaint differ from those for violation complaints.  
Even if the complaining party prevails on a non-violation claim, there 
would be no obligation for the defending party to withdraw the 
measure at issue.137  This means that non-violation complaints have 
inherent limitations with respect to remedies and therefore will ar-
guably not eliminate governmental measures relating to anticompeti-
tive practices.  In light of the foregoing, the United States was forced 
to search for another option to address trade concerns arising from 
restrictive business practices impeding access to export markets.  As 
discussed in the next section, positive comity is an example of such an 
option. 
D. Positive Comity 
A country, rather than unilaterally applying its own laws in an 
extraterritorial manner, may choose to request a foreign country to 
investigate and regulate anticompetitive activities within its jurisdic-
tion according to its domestic laws.  If the foreign country complies 
with this request, it does so according to “positive comity.”138  Tradi-
tionally, “comity” means refraining from applying one’s own competi-
tion laws in an extraterritorial manner, and in this sense it is also re-
 
 133. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes with 
Appendices (1 to 4), Apr. 15, 1994, art. XXVI.1(a), 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].  
The DSU was annexed to the WTO Agreement, supra note 4, as Annex 2. 
 134. See Japan—Film and Paper, supra note 53, ¶¶ 10.82–10.89. 
 135. Id. ¶ 10.402. 
 136. Since the United States did not appeal this panel’s ruling, the Appellate Body did not 
have an opportunity to review the legal rulings of the panel in this case, in particular, on non-
violation complaints.  In this sense, it is hard to predict whether and to what extent this panel’s 
rulings will serve as a precedent for future cases involving competition-related measures. 
 137. DSU, art. XXVI.1(b). 
 138. For the definition of the term “positive comity,” see supra Part II.B.1. 
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ferred to as “negative comity.”  Positive comity would appear to con-
tribute to the effective enforcement of antitrust law as well as to re-
ducing or eliminating jurisdictional conflicts arising between two dif-
ferent sovereigns.  
Although bilateral agreements addressing positive comity ap-
peared for the first time between the United States and the EU in 
1991,139 one can hardly find an instance where positive comity actually 
comes into play.  Recently, however, the United States has expressed 
some interest in positive comity as an effective solution for the inter-
national application of antitrust law.140  The United States entered 
into a new agreement concerning positive comity with the EU in June 
1998.  This agreement took the form of a side agreement to the above 
1991 bilateral agreement between the two parties.141  The core sub-
stance of this side agreement is that, under certain conditions, a re-
questing party would refrain from enforcing its own competition laws 
and would agree to request the other party to apply its domestic laws.  
In such instances, the requesting party agrees not to apply its domes-
tic laws extraterritorially—if it wishes to do so, it is required to ex-
plain the reasons for such action.  The requested party must thor-
oughly investigate the matter and report the results to the other party, 
and also comply with the other party’s request to the extent reason-
able.  Among the conditions potentially triggering such a request are 
cases in which the anticompetitive activity at issue does not affect the 
consumers of the requesting party142—for instance, in export-restraint 
cases.143 
 
 139. See Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition 
Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1491 (1991) [hereinafter Competition Laws Agreement]. 
 140. For instance, Joel Klein stated that “positive comity” agreements are the best way to 
ensure effective antitrust enforcement in cases involving market access problems.  See Klein, 
supra note 66. 
 141. For an overview of this side agreement, see supra notes 40, 43. 
 142. Article IV:2 of the Positive Comity Agreement signed in 1998 provides as follows: 
The competition authorities of a Requesting Party will normally defer or suspend their 
own enforcement activities in favour of enforcement activities by the competition au-
thorities of the Requested Party when the following conditions are satisfied: 
(a) The anticompetitive activities at issue: 
(i) do not have a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable impact on consumers in 
the Requesting Party territory, or 
(ii) where the anticompetitive activities do have such an impact on the Requesting 
Party consumers, they occur principally in and are directed principally towards the 
other Party territory; 
Positive Comity Agreement, supra note 43, at 29. 
 143. See Report on Positive Comity, supra note 40, ¶ 60. 
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The underlying motivation for the United States to resort to 
positive comity seems to be that all other policy options for the same 
purpose—the extraterritorial application of antitrust law, Section 301 
or the reliance on the WTO dispute settlement mechanism—have 
demonstrated serious limitations vis-à-vis actual enforcement.144  As 
for the EU, such an agreement would lower the risk of unilateral ap-
plication by the United States of U.S. antitrust law, while securing the 
same benefit of U.S. cooperation in a reciprocal manner.145  As a re-
sult, a question arises as to whether the United States’ other trading 
partners would be willing to enter into similar agreements on positive 
comity.  If so, positive comity might be a viable policy option to help 
the United States resolve antitrust concerns in export restraint cases.  
Yet, one must consider the practical problems of positive comity.  A 
report by the OECD Secretariat in May 1998 pointed out several 
problems concerning positive comity and made an assessment of its 
limits.146  A few of those points are worth considering here. 
First of all, positive comity is generally only applicable in cases 
where there is a violation of the antitrust law of the requested party.  
Thus, if the anticompetitive activity at issue was exempt from the laws 
of the requested party (for example in export/import cartels) or fell 
under exceptions under such laws, positive comity would fail.147  In the 
author’s view, what is often more troublesome is the application of 
the rule of reason to contested practices.  In the eyes of the requested 
country, a certain practice may not be in violation of its own antitrust 
law since such a practice can be saved when the rule of reason applies.  
In contrast, the requesting party may view such a practice as being an-
ticompetitive, and thus it might once again have incentive to apply its 
own laws extraterritorially. 
In addition, there is the problem of mutual trust.148  If the re-
questing party does not trust the competence, willingness, and en-
forcement level of the requested party’s competition authorities, it 
would seem logically difficult to rely on the requested party’s dili-
gence in investigation and regulation.  As a result, the requesting 
party would potentially be tempted to engage in the extraterritorial 
application of its own antitrust law, suggesting that positive comity is 
feasible only between countries that have comparable levels of com-
 
 144. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. 
 145. Id. ¶ 59. 
 146. See id. ¶¶ 48–56. 
 147. Id. ¶ 49. 
 148. Id. ¶ 51. 
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petition law enforcement—for example, between the United States 
and the EU. 
Finally and most importantly, one must look at the kinds of cases 
to which positive comity can actually apply.149  As noted in the bilat-
eral agreement between the United States and the EU, the United 
States would be most interested in applying positive comity to export-
restraint cases.150  This indicates a situation where the requesting 
party’s exports face market access difficulty due to restrictive business 
practices within the importing country.151  In the eyes of the United 
States, positive comity could overcome the theoretical and practical 
limitations of extraterritorial application of its antitrust law in export-
restraint cases.  Nevertheless, theoretical and practical concerns may 
again arise in this context.  On the theoretical side, except for hori-
zontal restraints such as group boycott, export restraints are more of-
ten than not subject to the rule of reason.152  Therefore, even if such 
practices produced trade-restrictive effects, the importing country’s 
antitrust authority may still determine that the rule of reason justifies 
non-regulation of such practices on the basis of the finding that pro-
competitive effects outweigh anticompetitive effects.  In other words, 
a certain activity may harm the interests of foreign traders, but it is 
still considered “procompetitive” under the importing market’s anti-
trust law.153  If the exporting country requested that the importing 
country regulate such activities on the basis of a positive comity 
agreement, such a request would not normally be served since such 
activities may not be violations of the requested country’s antitrust 
law.154 
This suggests that positive comity would not be an effective op-
tion for export-restraint cases.  On the practical side, if a bilateral 
agreement were to be entered into between the United States and a 
 
 149. Id. ¶¶ 57–61. 
 150. See id. ¶ 60. 
 151. The Report on Positive Comity also states that it is hard to find examples, other than 
market restraint cases, to which the U.S.-EU bilateral agreement would apply.  Id. ¶¶ 59–61. 
 152. For a more elaborate analysis of several examples of market restraints, see Fox, supra 
note 55, at 19–23. 
 153. This scenario often takes place in vertical restraints, in particular.  The OECD has stud-
ied this issue for the last several years.  See generally OECD, Joint Group on Trade and Compe-
tition, Competition and Trade Effects of Vertical Restraints, OECD Doc. 
COM/DAFFE/CLP/TD(99)54 (May 23, 1997) (concluding that some vertical restraints are det-
rimental to efficiency, while others enhance efficiency to the extent that it is more than enough 
to offset any detrimental effects). 
 154. Moreover, some developing countries might not have any competition law at all.  See 
supra note 69. 
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developing country, the former would very often be the requesting 
party, whereas the latter would normally serve as the requested party, 
potentially leading to difficulties of reciprocity.  If reciprocity be-
tween two relevant countries cannot be maintained, many problems, 
including cost considerations, may arise and create strong disincen-
tives for other countries to sign a bilateral agreement on positive 
comity with the United States. 
In light of the foregoing, it can be concluded that positive comity 
may not be a workable policy option for the Untied States to resolve 
competition-related trade concerns in all types of situations.  In that 
sense, positive comity will not preempt the need to resort to a multi-
lateral framework. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
From the perspective of trade law and policy, restrictive business 
practices, which function as private trade barriers, need to be ad-
dressed under the WTO system.  The conflict between trade and 
competition law and policy that has arisen due to different substan-
tive standards may lead to a difficult situation where certain activities 
have trade-restrictive effects but are pro-competitive in importing 
markets.  Due to their theoretical and practical limits, the current set 
of policy options which the United States has relied upon to address 
competition-related trade concerns does not provide a workable 
means to address trade-restrictive measures in foreign markets.  The 
extraterritorial application of antitrust law is not an effective tool for 
export-restraint cases, and Section 301 or positive comity are not vi-
able alternative options to address market access-related competition 
concerns due to their inherent weaknesses.  In addition, the WTO 
system currently does not provide a solution to U.S. concerns.  In 
other words, the current WTO Agreement does not have legally bind-
ing rules that effectively address trade-restrictive anticompetitive 
practices.  Further, a non-violation complaint under the WTO dispute 
settlement process is still far from an effective option to address com-
petition-related measures. 
In light of the foregoing analysis, the author strongly suggests 
that the United States refrain from engaging in unilateral or bilateral 
policy options in an effort to address issues arising from the interac-
tion between trade and competition law and policy, as such options 
are theoretically unsound and practically unworkable, while produc-
ing unnecessary tensions between nations.  Instead, it is recom-
mended that the United States more seriously participate in the WTO 
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work on the interaction between trade and competition and, further-
more, take a leadership role in pushing for formal negotiations on a 
multilateral framework agreement on competition policy.  Of course, 
the author deeply appreciates the possible difficulties that a WTO op-
tion to address the issues arising between trade and competition may 
entail.  For instance, harmonizing competition laws for the entire 
WTO Membership is an unrealistic approach at this moment.  As 
noted, however, neither current proposals by WTO Members nor ini-
tiatives at the WTO Competition Working Group have progressed 
that far.155  It is outside the scope of this paper to examine whether, 
and to what extent, such proposals and current WTO works are desir-
able and workable.  Such an examination would surely require further 
independent research and writing. 
As previously noted, the WTO initiatives on the interaction be-
tween trade and competition policy are legally in limbo, due to the 
failure to reach a consensus on the modalities of negotiations.  The 
United States is urged to lead the effort in building this consensus at 
an appropriate WTO forum in the future.  This paper concludes with 
some suggestions for the substantive aspects of such negotiation mo-
dalities, taking into consideration the disappointing results of the 
Cancun Ministerial Conference.  The author believes that the formal 
negotiations on the interaction should at least include the following 
items: 
(1) The title of the relevant Doha mandate is “Interaction on 
Trade and Competition.”  The WTO Members should always keep in 
mind that the main mission of work in this area is to deal with issues 
arising at the interface of these two policies, rather than to draft a 
competition code at an international level.  Thus, Members are rec-
ommended to start with a more elaborate study of how trade law and 
policy interacts with competition law and policy.  This seems to be a 
theoretical exercise, but needs to be addressed first.  Part II of this 
paper would be useful for this purpose. 
(2) The Doha mandate indicates that the debate on the interac-
tion between trade and competition is aimed at examining how com-
petition policy can contribute to international trade and development.  
In this connection, Members need to study carefully how already ex-
isting competition policy-related provisions under the current WTO 
agreements can contribute to this goal.  This paper noted the lack of 
 
 155. Robert Anderson & Peter Holmes, Competition Policy and the Future of the Multilat-
eral Trading System, 5(2) J. INT’L ECON. L. 531, 557–60 (2002). 
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legally binding effect in such provisions.  Nonetheless, should there be 
such limits, Members should start discussing how to improve the cur-
rent existing competition-related provisions.  Logically, this should be 
a starting point for the WTO work on the interaction between trade 
and competition.  For instance, such provisions could be modified so 
as to be workable under the dispute settlement framework. 
(3) Finally, it should be recalled that any final outcome of the fu-
ture negotiations on trade and competition policy would be incorpo-
rated into the WTO system as an annexed agreement, rather than be 
a stand-alone agreement outside the purview of the WTO.  There-
fore, such a future agreement should fit within the framework of the 
current WTO system and its annexed agreements.  In this regard, 
Members need to determine which model would be adopted for such 
an agreement on trade and competition policy.  Three models, drawn 
from the current WTO-annexed agreements, may be considered: the 
TRIPS Agreement model, the GATS Agreement model, and the 
Market Access Code model.  The TRIPS model would set minimum 
standards for competition policy and affirmatively require Members 
to equip themselves with competition law and enforcement mecha-
nisms.  Given the lack of consensus on substantive rules of competi-
tion laws among the WTO Members, this model could be considered 
as strictly a long-term goal.156  A GATS model would declare general 
principles that allow some flexibility for different Members, e.g., ex-
ceptions or special and differential treatment for developing Mem-
bers.  At the same time, building a consensus on substantive rules 
would be deferred to future negotiations.157  Lastly, a Market Access 
Code is a third option that could potentially leverage the WTO’s ex-
pertise and resources in skillfully dealing with market access-related 
concerns, such as private trade barriers.  Although this model seems 
to provide a partial solution only, it could be a viable initial step to 
address market-restraint practices, in light of the fact that this model 
most closely resembles the original work of the GATT, the WTO’s 
predecessor.  Of course, these proposed models should be further 
evaluated and elaborated upon in the process of further negotiations 
at the WTO. 
 
 156. The TRIPS Agreement sets minimum standards for the protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights, which are binding upon WTO Members.  See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Apr. 15, 1994, arts. 12, 18 & 33, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, supra note 4, 33 I.L.M. 81, 88–96. 
 157. See generally General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 44. 
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The long journey toward a cohesive multilateral WTO frame-
work agreement on the interaction between trade and competition of 
course will not be in the mode of a honeymoon.  However, it is the 
correct direction for the United States as well as for its trading part-
ners.  Maintaining the status quo or embarking on an alternative 
route present valid options to address troublesome issues arising from 
the interaction between trade and competition. 
 
